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National counter-terrorism strategy 
 
Introduction 
 
The Government Security and Defence Policy Report 2009 states that the likelihood of 
terrorism against Finland is low. However, it also asserts that since the possibility does 
exist, it is important that Finland make preparedness arrangements and draw up a 
national counter-terrorism strategy.   
 
This strategy and the Security and Defence Policy Report both follow the premise that 
the threat of terrorism is with us and the recognition of the importance of preparedness 
arrangements in Finland.  
 
The close link between internal and external security becomes particularly evident in the 
fight against terrorism. This strategy provides an overview of the terrorism situation in 
Finland and Europe, existing legislation and arrangements that have been made by the 
authorities. Building on the current situation picture, the strategy then goes on to 
propose concrete and timetabled measures to step up the work on combating terrorism. 
 
Finland must be prepared for terrorism as part of its general preparedness while taking 
due account of the distinctive features of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Terrorism and 
related situation assessment can change quickly as the underlying causes of terrorism or 
terrorists’ methods change. In addition to immediate and likely threats, the authorities 
must be prepared and have plans in place to monitor and counter any new threats on the 
horizon.  
 
In addition to national preparedness, Finland takes an active part in international 
counter-terrorism cooperation. Due to the global nature of terrorism, cooperation is 
necessary both between authorities and at a wider international level – particularly 
within the EU – on different areas of security. Internationally, both practical operational 
cooperation between authorities and political influence within the framework of 
international law are essential. 
 
In Finland, the police have the primary responsibility for combating terrorism. 
However, the capability to effectively fight terrorism requires continuous and consistent 
cooperation not only between all security authorities but also other authorities and a 
wide range of other actors. 
 
Cooperation between authorities is essential to counter-terrorism in order to make best 
possible use of the counter-terrorism resources available to the authorities and relevant 
organisations. We can meet the challenges of counter-terrorism by taking advantage of 
the cooperation that already exists between authorities and of their general preparedness 
arrangements. Here too we must rely on Finland’s special strength – efficient and 
effective cooperation between authorities. 
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The underlying theme of this strategy is to maintain the high level of state activity and 
to further develop cooperation and coordination.  
 
The actions of the authorities must also be consistent and appropriately transparent in 
the field of counter-terrorism. Respect for the rule of law, democracy, fundamental 
rights and good governance in Finland concerns us all. In some cases, the internal 
situation may contribute to the development of social ills that manifest themselves in 
disturbances and a sense of insecurity. Problems must be identified and addressed 
before they become the causes of or pretexts for violence.  
 
The actions of the authorities alone are not enough to ensure internal security. To ensure 
Finland’s internal and external security, political decision-makers, national and local 
authorities, civil society and the business sector must work together to combat violence 
and its root causes. In view of this, the basis of this strategy is to prevent terrorism by 
tackling and addressing the root causes of terrorism. 
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1 General information 
 
1.1 Definition of terrorism, Finnish legislation on 
terrorism, and national and international guidelines   
 
There is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism. Terrorism usually involves 
violence or the threat of violence to achieve certain goals and to cause disorder or fear. 
Finnish legislation provides for the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist 
offences and the imposition of penalties. In addition, the Government has laid down 
guidelines on counter-terrorism and called for its further development. 
 
The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Action Plan both set out counter-
terrorism priorities for Member States to take into account. The United Nations (UN) 
has elaborated a total of 16 universal conventions and protocols against terrorism. The 
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism is an instrument which 
deals with counter-terrorism while taking full account of the legal protection for 
individuals. Finland is actively involved in the development of international regulation 
on counter-terrorism. Finland considers it important that the legal protection for 
individuals is ensured as international regulation on counter-terrorism becomes more 
extensive. 
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2 Terrorism situation in Europe and 
Finland   
              
2.1 Terrorism situation in Europe 
 
The threat of terrorism facing Europe is complex. The most significant terrorist threat to 
Europe comes from al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. In recent years, however, most of 
the failed, foiled or successfully executed terrorist attacks have been committed by 
separatist groups. 
 
Separatist terrorist activities are orchestrated mainly by the Basque terrorist organisation 
ETA and Corsican terrorist groups but also by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the 
Irish Real IRA (RIRA) and Continuity IRA (CIRA), as along with the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The attacks committed in Europe by these organisations cause 
relatively small numbers of casualties. Most of the attacks are targeted at infrastructure; 
they are directed against the police, military targets, political targets, and occasionally 
against the private commercial sector. Separatist groups are also known to seek 
cooperation partners outside Europe. Violent groups in the North Caucasus have 
become more active and may be extending their operations to Russia. 
Random terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland have not managed to spark a new spiral of 
violence or to wage, at least not so far, a coherent terrorist campaign. At the same time, 
the disarmament of Protestant unionist groups continues. The PKK reportedly still 
commits minor crimes or acts of violence in Europe, usually in connection with 
demonstrations.  In addition, the PKK is active in raising funding and carrying out other 
support activities in Europe. With the help of a support network extending to Europe, 
the LTTE’s activities have focused on collecting money from Tamil migrants through 
criminal means. 
 
The number of terrorist attacks committed by extreme left-wing groups advocating 
violence has increased to some extent, particularly in Greece, Spain and Italy. 
Motivated by a commonly shared goal, extreme left-wing terrorist groups have 
established connections across state borders. In some European countries, the levels of 
left-wing terrorism and violence have been increasing, together with the number of 
anarchist demonstrations and level of political unrest. Also right-wing extremists have 
recently committed isolated violent acts in Germany.  
 
Terrorism motivated by extreme religious beliefs is considered to represent the greatest 
threat mainly because the attacks and plots carried out so far have shown that those 
making them intend to inflict mass casualties. In Europe, the number of people linked to 
terrorism motivated by extreme religious ideologies is still high; this becomes evident in 
the number of people arrested in Belgium, Spain and Germany, for example. In addition 
to international political factors, national factors such as possible negative attitudes 
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towards ethnic minorities or their religious beliefs, or the lack of a coherent migration 
policy, may contribute to the level of threat remaining high. European terrorism 
motivated by extreme religious beliefs is strongly connected to conflict areas outside the 
EU. Pakistan, Afghanistan and, within the last twelve months, Somalia have replaced 
Iraq as primary conflicts in which extreme radicals want to participate.   
 
The role of Yemen as a new conflict area became apparent in January 2009 when al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was formed by a merger between al-Qaeda’s Saudi and 
Yemeni wings. The regional and global threat posed by this new group manifested itself 
in the failed terrorist attack on a passenger flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on 
Christmas Day in 2009. Many of the recent terrorist acts or attempts made in Western 
countries and motivated by extreme religious beliefs are linked to Yemen. There is a 
danger that Yemen will emerge as a new staging post for radical organisations, and this 
would have a long-lasting impact on international security.  
 
Throughout Europe, there are signs of small groups and individuals taking violent 
action as a result of becoming radicalised. The underlying causes of this phenomenon 
include a feeling of alienation from the rest of society among second or third generation 
immigrants, a sense of rootlessness, social exclusion, and on top of all this, the activities 
of active recruiters. Recruitment and radicalisation in Europe take place, for example, in 
reception centres, educational institutions, prisons, and various meetings or gatherings 
such as sports camps. The use of the Internet as a tool for radicalisation is continually 
increasing. Online recruitment and radicalisation take place mainly on websites to 
which access is controlled. In particular, recruitment for violent activities is now taking 
place in meetings closed from outsiders, not so much at public events. 
 
The operational capabilities of al-Qaeda’s core group are deemed to have deteriorated as 
a result of air strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has not succeeded in its 
attacks in Europe since 2005, but there have been many disrupted terrorist plots. Now 
the organisation is thought to be keeping itself in the public eye through propaganda and 
expanding its network by joining forces with regional terrorist organisations. It is also 
believed that al-Qaeda is continuing to hatch terrorist plots against Muslim governments 
and Western targets. It has named certain European states as its primary targets. 
 
Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group with links to al-Qaeda that is battling to overthrow the 
Somali government, has succeeded in persuading supporters in Europe and the United 
States to take part in the fighting and to attend terrorist training camps in Somalia. 
Those travelling to Somalia for reasons of nationalism are not considered to represent a 
significant threat upon their return. A far greater threat is posed by returning activists 
who went to Somalia to join the international holy war to gain combat experience. 
 
The number of Europeans travelling to conflict areas has increased in many European 
countries; it is noticeable that violent radical groups operating in these countries have 
close links to conflict areas. This becomes evident not only in the movement of people 
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between conflict areas and Europe but also in the form of logistical support, such as the 
maintenance of the financial resources of terrorist organisations and the provision of 
forged documents to them. 
 
 
2.2 Terrorism situation in Finland 
 
At present, there are no signs that any European separatist or political terrorist 
organisation will pose a real terrorist threat in Finland in the near future. However, it is 
not out of the question that Finnish citizens might become victims of terrorism abroad, 
for example in areas where terrorist organisations seek to target a country’s tourist 
industry. It is also possible that efforts may be made from Finland to finance terrorist 
organisations operating abroad. It is also possible that Finland could be used a staging 
post or rest area.   
 
Terrorism motivated by extreme religious beliefs and practised by al-Qaeda and 
likeminded groups is the most serious form of terrorism threatening Europe and 
Finland. The level of the threat varies from country to country, although it has become 
generalised to some extent. More and more often, extremist groups make threats against 
countries involved in crisis management operations. The groups making the threats do 
not necessarily need to have the capability or the resources to carry them out. Once they 
have drawn attention to the intended targets, threats uttered may often be carried out by 
others, for example violently radicalised individuals. A threat against one EU Member 
State may also affect other Member States.   
  
So far, Finland is not considered a target country for terrorism, and the immediate 
terrorist threat against the country or its citizens is low at present. However, factors have 
emerged that could affect the level of the threat in the future. These factors include 
Finland’s participation in international crisis management operations and the increasing 
number of people in our country that are linked to terrorism in conflict areas.  
 
Illegal entry into Finland takes place mainly across its European Union internal borders 
where border checks have been abolished. From a terrorist threat assessment 
perspective, this involves both short-term and long-term risks. People linked to 
terrorism might try to use illegal routes of entry. It is possible that Finland could be used 
as a staging post or rest area, or for arranging funding for terrorist networks operating in 
their countries of origin or other countries across the world.  
 
The Finnish Muslim community is moderate and acts as a counterforce to such religious 
radicalisation that might lead to the support of violent action. The number of second and 
third generation immigrants who may be vulnerable to radicalisation is growing in 
Finland. So far, there are no visible signs of wide-scale radicalisation leading to 
violence. However, there are certain ethnic groups whose members, either in small 
groups or individually, support violent groups operating abroad. There are also signs 
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that efforts are being made to find new supporters for this kind of activity in places such 
as reception centres where immigrants are vulnerable to radicalisation.  
  
There is a danger that Finland may be seen as an easy operating environment for people 
and networks supporting terrorism, who as a result may seek to use our country as a 
staging post for terrorist activities. It is known that there are people in Finland who have 
active contacts with bodies practising terrorism. 
 
There are indications that actors in Finland are involved in supporting terrorist networks 
operating abroad. Terrorist support activities are connected with groups with ethnic 
backgrounds, and with conflicts prevailing in their home countries. It is possible that 
some of the money sent by various means from Finland is used to support terrorist 
activities. Legal charitable associations can be abused to raise or move funds for 
terrorist groups. Proving such illegal use of funds is, however, difficult. Terrorist 
support may also be logistical, for example sending material assistance or using the 
country as a rest or transit area for people involved in armed action. It is also possible 
that people living in Finland participate or are seeking to participate in resistance 
struggles in their home countries or that they are trying to recruit other people to take 
part in armed conflicts.   
 
There are obvious present and future threats against the embassies and other interests in 
Finland of those countries that have been identified as terrorist targets. Major 
international events organised in Finland, such as summits, sports events and 
conferences, are also potential targets for terrorist attacks.   
 
The Danish cartoon crisis is a good example of how a European country can quickly 
become a target for hatred among radical groups. Thus, we cannot exclude the 
possibility of such unpredictable crisis arising in Finland, too.   
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3 Current state of counter-terrorism 
  
3.1 Preventing violent radicalisation 
 
Effective cooperation between authorities and civil society helps to prevent people from 
turning to terrorism by tackling the factors driving terrorism that can lead to violent 
radicalisation and recruitment into terrorist groups. Inter-cultural and inter-religious 
dialogue is being promoted at international and national levels. Human rights, equality 
in all its forms, democracy, social inclusion and acceptance of multiculturalism all serve 
to prevent social exclusion. The authorities are striving to combat racially motivated 
crimes and to increase equality and tolerance.  
 
An analysis will be made to anticipate trends in extremism in society. Prevention of 
violent radicalisation is the most effective way to combat violent attacks as it stops the 
radicalisation process even before people gravitate towards such ways of thinking. 
Identifying and preventing violent radicalisation and illegal extremist activities require 
broad-based cooperation between authorities. Information gathering is central to the 
development and targeting of preventive measures against terrorism. 
 
 
3.2 Detecting and pursuing and terrorists 
 
International and national information exchange and cooperation between authorities 
helps to identify threats and risks and to address them effectively, with due regard to the 
aspects of legal protection. Steps will be taken to monitor the activities of those linked 
to terrorism and to investigate and disrupt terrorist financing.  
 
Activities and crimes against Finland that may threaten the governmental system, social 
institutions or the internal or external security of the State are to be identified and 
prevented at the earliest possible stage. What is important in detecting and pursuing 
terrorists is effective intelligence work and coordination and sound analysis of 
information. As part of basic preparedness, measures will be taken to ensure that 
security authorities have sufficient powers to prevent terrorist offences. 
 
 
3.3 Protecting citizens and infrastructure 
 
The protection of society and its various elements is based on the action taken to 
maintain a state of society and internal security in which everyone in Finland can enjoy 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law and a safe society. Measures will 
be taken to combat fear or insecurity brought about by crime, unrest, accidents, violence 
or any other unwelcome changes in Finland or the increasingly globalised world at 
large. 
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The security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure will be improved. Measures 
will be taken to protect from terrorist attacks citizens and infrastructure, along with 
production capacity critical to the functioning of society; this will be done by reducing 
any vulnerabilities through cooperation between authorities, local actors and the 
business sector.    
 
 
3.4 Preparing and responding  
 
The authorities have in place their own contingency and security plans and carry out 
training and practice exercises based on them. These, together with their readiness 
systems for operational command and terrorism situation assessment, constitute the 
basis for the cooperation in saving human lives and property that is central to 
preparedness. Efforts will be made to minimise the consequences and effects of a 
potential attack by introducing well-coordinated and effective counter-measures and by 
responding to the needs of Finnish people who fall victims to terrorist attacks in Finland 
or abroad.  
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4 Strategic counter-terrorism guidelines 
and their implementation 
 
General principles 
 
Terrorist acts cause direct harm to society and citizens. Such acts can also cause long-
term and large-scale damage to the functioning of the whole society. It is vitally 
important for citizens and society at large that terrorist acts be prevented. This requires 
that the violent radicalisation that leads to terrorism be identified early and its 
underlying causes addressed. In addition, terrorist undertakings and plans must be 
prevented, detected and investigated. In Finland, counter-terrorism should be based on 
the early identification of terrorism-related phenomena and the prevention of terrorist 
acts. 
 
In Finland, the competent authorities, the business sector and NGOs are working 
together to prepare for and respond to any unrest. The chains of command and 
responsibilities of the authorities in such circumstances, including terrorist attacks, are 
clearly set out in the existing legislation. The extent to which terrorism is taken into 
account in preparing for unrest, for example in contingency and security planning, 
varies from one authority to another. Preparedness for terrorism and respond to concrete 
situations must be part of the authorities’ normal preparedness, and both are planned for 
and implemented within the framework of the normal preparedness and command 
systems.  
 
Strategic guidelines 
 
1. Measures will be taken to prevent and combat violent radicalisation. It 
will be identified at the earliest possible stage. Necessary information will 
be transferred to the responsible authorities. 
 
Basis: 
 
In Finland, there are no signs of wide-scale violent radicalisation that is, international 
experience suggests, often motivated by a sense of social injustice or exclusion. It is 
evident, however, that there are small groups or individual people in Finland who 
support violent groups operating abroad. Finnish authorities should seek to promote 
equality between different social groups and good relations between ethnic groups. In 
preventing violent radicalisation, the challenge for the authorities is to identify 
radicalisation among individuals and to respond in a timely fashion to such cases after 
they have been identified.  
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Measures: 
 
a. To prevent violent radicalisation by delivering an effective integration policy. 
To combat the social exclusion of groups and individuals by ensuring they have 
equal opportunities to participate in Finnish society, training and working life.  
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health, Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Ministry of Education 
 
Timetable: Ongoing 
 
b. To increase research, information exchange between the authorities and training 
related to terrorism and violent radicalisation, with a view to identifying possible 
developments that may lead to violence. To draw up and implement a training 
programme for the authorities, with the aim of identifying and preventing 
radicalisation and related phenomena.  
 
Responsible authorities: National Police Board, Security Police, Police College 
of Finland, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
 
Timetable: The training programme will be implemented as soon as it is 
finalised by the end of 2010. 
 
c. To take account of the prevention of violent radicalisation in local security 
planning. 
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health together with local authorities 
 
Timetable: Ongoing 
 
 
 
2. Legislation and statutes on information exchange between different  
authorities should be reviewed in the light of changes in the operating  
environment and how terrorist offences are planned and committed. 
 
Basis: 
 
The actions taken by the authorities to detect, prevent and investigate terrorist offences 
are based on law. Terrorist activities and how they are planned and sustained are 
constantly changing because both terrorist groups and the authorities’ counter-measures 
change. Without constant review, development and updating, our legislation cannot 
respond to changes in the operating environment. It must also be ensured that the 
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authorities have the right of access to information and all powers necessary to take 
preventive action and carry out investigations. 
 
The police authorities consider that the current wording of Chapter 34a of the Criminal 
Code concerning terrorist financing has led to difficult problems in producing sufficient 
proof when pre-trial investigations have been initiated. Under the existing legislation, 
financing the direction and training of a terrorist group and recruitment into such a 
group is not punishable. Under the Criminal Code, participation in terrorist training is 
not a criminal act either. Many European Union Member States have criminalised 
training for terrorist activity. 
 
At present, people working in the social and health care sector do not have the legal 
right to report, on their own initiative, a person who might be planning a terrorist act 
and who comes to their attention while on duty. Provisions on the obligations of secrecy 
and non-disclosure in such situations are laid down in the Act on the Status and Rights 
of Social Welfare Clients, the Act on Health Care Professionals and the Act on the 
Status and Rights of Patients. The only exception to this is Chapter 15, section 10 of the 
Criminal Code, under which the representatives of these professional groups are also 
considered obliged, on pain of penalty, to report any planned crimes. A planned crime 
means a plan that has already proceeded a long way in terms of implementation.   
 
The Act on Executive Assistance to the Police by the Defence Forces lays down 
provisions on the right of the police to receive executive assistance that requires the use 
of force by the Defence Forces and on the use of military force as part of executive 
assistance. The Border Guard also has a statutory duty to participate in counter-
terrorism and the management of special situations. When performing these duties, 
border guards have the powers laid down in Chapter 2 of the Police Act. Under the 
existing legislation, it is not, however, possible for the Border Guard to give such 
executive assistance to the police that includes the use of military force. 
 
Measures: 
 
d. To establish what possible amendments need to be made to the legislation on 
terrorist financing and training and to the legislation on information exchange 
and executive assistance between the authorities, and to prepare such 
amendments as necessary.  
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Defence, Office of the Prosecutor 
General, Security Police, National Bureau of Investigation and Border Guard 
 
Timetable: The necessary reports will be completed in autumn 2010. 
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3. Full account will be taken of terrorism-related factors in security and 
contingency planning. 
 
Basis:  
 
As part of the authorities’ security and contingency planning, general preparedness for 
such incidents as major accidents and difficult rescue operations aims to cover a wide 
range of potentially serious threats. The special situations set out in the Strategy for 
Securing the Functions Vital to Society include those related to terrorism. The 
distinctive features of such situations that impact preparedness will be taken into 
account in planning.   
 
In counter-terrorism it is important that authorities take the necessary preventive and 
operational measures to detect and combat the full range of threats and to protect society 
and its members from them. It is also essential to prevent dangerous materials and 
sensitive information from falling into the wrong hands, and to give critical targets 
adequate protection. Preventive measures include nuclear safety and control carried out 
by the authorities for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive 
(CBRNE) materials. Protection measures cover detection (intelligence, analysis, field 
measurements), which is part of the operational work of the police and other authorities, 
and control of hazardous substances at the border.  
 
A large number of sites of great economic significance are in private hands, and by law 
the private sector has its own preparedness obligations, just as the state does. Public-
private partnership can reduce the vulnerability of society. Training provided by the 
authorities enables the private sector to improve the protection of sites through its own 
security organisations by, for example, drafting and implementing risk-based security 
plans.  
 
Measures: 
 
e. To revise the authorities’ security and contingency planning processes for the 
fight against terrorism as necessary in order to ensure that necessary terrorism-
related information is available for use in local security planning. 
 
Responsible authorities: National Police Board, Security Police, counter-
terrorism working group 
 
Timetable: The system will be operational by the end of 2010. 
 
National counter-terrorism strategy 
13 
f. To improve the private sector’s preparedness and operational capabilities for 
dealing with terrorist acts by taking account of terrorism, as a threat scenario, in 
the situation assessment that is currently being prepared for the business sector 
in accordance with the Internal Security Programme. 
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior, Security Police, Prime 
Minister’s Office 
 
Timetable: A proposal for the content and practices of the situation assessment 
will be completed by 30 July 2010. 
 
g. To introduce more public-private partnership agreements to strengthen 
cooperation between the public and business sectors within the framework of 
organisations responsible for security of supply, and to further develop existing 
agreements in order to improve information exchange between the sectors. 
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior, National Emergency Supply 
Agency, National Police Board, counter-terrorism working group 
 
Timetable:  Ongoing 
 
h. To introduce tighter controls on CBRNE materials in accordance with the 
international obligations binding on Finland. To assess the risk-based control 
and protection procedures for CBRNE materials and of institutions handling 
such materials and to implement any necessary development measures. To 
assess the response preparedness of the authorities and to implement any 
necessary development measures. 
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board, 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defence, 
Defence Forces, Customs, Border Guard, Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, CBRNE cooperation platform. 
 
Timetable: Both the assessment and development plan will be completed by the 
end of 2011. 
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4. State leaders and competent authorities will be provided with a carefully 
analysed, high-quality and real-time picture of the security situation that 
clearly identifies terrorism-related issues. 
 
Basis: 
 
It should be possible to make use of terrorism-related situation and threat assessments 
both in national crisis preparedness and decision-making by the state leaders and 
authorities. It is the duty of the Security Police to combat activities and crimes that may 
threaten the governmental system, social institutions, or the internal or external security 
of the State. As part of this duty, the Security Police are responsible for creating a 
national and international picture of the terrorism situation and making terrorism threat 
assessments. The situation and threat assessments draw on open source and classified 
information received from other authorities and on other such information available to 
the Security Police. 
 
Measures: 
 
i. To have a new counter-terrorism working group assess the terrorism situation on 
a regular basis. Having done this, the working group may propose measures to 
be taken by the authorities to step up the work on combating terrorism. 
 
Responsible authorities: National Police Board, Security Police 
 
Timetable: Once the working group has been established. 
 
j. To improve the situation picture, analysis and reporting relating to terrorism and 
other security threats to society, with particular emphasis on the coordination of 
public and non-public information.  
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior, Prime Minister’s Office and 
other ministries involved in creating the situation picture. 
 
Timetable: By the end of 2011. 
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5. Counter-terrorism cooperation between the authorities and related 
coordination will be enhanced. Counter-terrorism cooperation will be 
improved and activities better coordinated. Counter-terrorism measures will 
be based on the latest situation and threat assessments available to the 
authorities. 
 
Basis:  
 
Terrorism and counter-terrorism - and the underlying causes of terrorism - are of 
concern to a large number of administrative sectors and authorities. The police have the 
primary responsibility for combating terrorism. In rescue operations, the responsibility 
rests with the rescue services, and in maritime situations, with the Border Guard. The 
Security Police make situation and threat assessments based on criminal intelligence 
about terrorist offences and other gathering of information on terrorism. The underlying 
causes of terrorism, violent radicalisation, and questions of preparedness and protection 
touch several other authorities. 
 
Effective cooperation between agencies and executive assistance arrangements between 
the responsible authorities in different sectors enable them to respond to trouble in 
society and address the factors driving it. A terrorist act is an action that represents a 
significant threat to society, and account must be taken of its distinctive features in all 
actions of the authorities and cooperation. 
 
Measures: 
 
k. To replace the current counter-terrorism expert group with a broad-based 
counter-terrorism working group whose tasks include to coordinate cooperation 
between authorities and preparedness measures for terrorism-related issues, to 
make use of expert networks of different authorities in combating terrorism, and 
to coordinate the implementation of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
and related development proposals.  
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior + authorities appointed to the 
working group 
 
Timetable: By the end of March 2010. 
 
l. To improve the sharing of terrorism-related intelligence between the competent 
authorities for the purposes of carrying out their duties. 
 
Responsible authorities: Counter-terrorism working group, Security Police 
 
Timetable: Since the establishment of the working group. 
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m. To prevent high risk persons from settling in Finland by increasing and 
reinforcing cooperation between the Finnish authorities, including using liaison 
officers working abroad and drawing on their expertise in immigration matters. 
To ensure that the authorities dealing with immigration matters are aware of 
terrorism-related factors and follow procedures enabling the transfer of all 
necessary information to the responsible authorities.  
 
Responsible authorities: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Finnish Immigration Service, National Police Board, Security Police, Border 
Guard 
 
Timetable: As soon as possible. Training for these authorities will be included in 
the training programme mentioned above. 
  
n. To develop, under the leadership of the police, the performance and 
interoperability of different authorities’ special intervention units. 
 
Responsible authorities: National Police Board, Border Guard, rescue services, 
Defence Forces 
 
Timetable: As of 2010. 
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Appendice 1: Operating environment and situation assessment 
 
 
